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Abstract This article presents a formal dialogue game for adjudication dialogues. Exist-
ing AI & law models of legal dialogues and argumentation-theoretic models of persuasion
are extended with a neutral third party, to give a more realistic account of the adjudicator’s
role in legal procedures. The main feature of the model is a division into an argumentation
phase, where the adversaries plea their case and the adjudicator has a largely mediating role,
and a decision phase, where the adjudicator decides the dispute on the basis of the claims,
arguments and evidence put forward in the argumentation phase. The model allows for ex-
plicit decisions on admissibility of evidence and burden of proof by the adjudicator in the
argumentation phase. Adjudication is modelled as putting forward arguments, in particular
undercutting and priority arguments, in the decision phase. The model reconciles logical
aspects of burden of proof induced by the defeasible nature of arguments with dialogical
aspects of burden of proof as something that can be allocated by explicit decisions on legal
grounds.
1 Introduction
This article1 studies the formal modelling of the role of third parties in procedures for dis-
pute resolution. The procedural aspects of legal reasoning have been a main research topic
in AI & Law since researchers started to realise that legal reasoning is bound not only by
the rules of logic and rational inference but also by those of fair and effective procedure.
This ‘procedural turn’ was initiated by two papers, Gordon (1993) and Hage et al. (1994),
and further pursued in e.g. (Bench-Capon; 1998; Prakken and Gordon; 1998; Lodder; 1999;
Hage; 2000; Vreeswijk; 2000; Leenes; 2001; Prakken; 2001b); see also Brewka (2001). The
main focus of this area is the integration of logical models of legal reasoning (especially
those using tools from nonmonotonic logic) with dialogue game models of argumentation.
The resulting models regulate the use of argumentative speech acts, such as making, dis-
puting and conceding claims and putting forward argument and counterarguments, and they
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2define the outcome of a dispute in terms of the effects of these speech acts on the ‘informa-
tion state’ of the dispute. The main guiding idea is that of procedural justice, according to
which the quality of a legal decision not only depends on its content but also on how it was
reached. This is partly inspired by the analogous idea of procedural rationality, defended
by e.g. Toulmin (1958); Rescher (1977) and Loui (1998) (who interestingly were in turn
inspired by the analogy with legal procedures).
Although all this work has been very valuable, further research is needed. Most AI &
Law work so far has concentrated on two-party dialogues between two adversaries. If the
judge’s role is modelled at all, it is limited to some very simple activities, such as regulating
turntaking (Bench-Capon; 1998; Bench-Capon et al.; 2000) or determining the truth of the
parties’ claims by simply saying “true” or “false” (Hage et al.; 1994; Brewka; 2001). Yet in
actual legal procedures judges have a much more elaborate role. The main aim of the present
paper is to show how procedural models of legal argument can give more realistic accounts
of the judge’s role in legal disputes. I will focus in particular on aspects that are directly
relevant for the outcome of a dispute, viz. rulings on burden of proof and admissibility of
evidence, and the adjudication of the conflict in the judge’s final decision. Thus I hope to
clarify the relation between the logical and procedural aspects of legal reasoning.
More generally, this paper will contribute to the study of dialogue in argumentation the-
ory. So far most studies of the dialogical aspects of legal reasoning have, either explicitly
or implicitly, applied the model of so-called persuasion dialogue as developed in argumen-
tation theory (Mackenzie; 1979; Walton and Krabbe; 1995; Prakken; 2006). In persuasion
dialogues two self-interested parties aim to persuade each other that they are right and the
other is wrong. Although this is clearly what happens between a plaintiff and defendant in
a civil case and between prosecutor and accused in a criminal case, the persuasion model
leaves no room for an adjudicator. In persuasion as modelled in argumentation theory the
disagreeing parties are in full control of the outcome: if they do not want to admit that they
are wrong, they cannot be forced to do so. In legal procedures, by contrast, the outcome ulti-
mately depends on the adjudicator’s decision, so in legal procedures the disagreeing parties
should not persuade each other but the adjudicator. In other words, legal procedure does not
fully fit the model of persuasion dialogue. Accordingly, one aim of this paper is to add a
model of so-called adjudication dialogues to the study of formal dialectics in argumentation
theory.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the characteristics of adjudication pro-
cesses will be described in more detail, after which in section 3 the formal tools used in
this paper will be introduced, viz. formal dialectics, logics for defeasible argumentation and
my own framework for persuasion dialogues. Section 4, which forms the heart of this pa-
per, extends and instantiates my persuasion framework to a three-player dialogue game for
adjudication. This game is illustrated with some examples in Section 5 and more generally
discussed in the concluding Section 6.
2 Characteristics of adjudication
In this section the characteristics of adjudication procedures will be discussed as far as they
are relevant for present purposes.
32.1 Overview
A typical adjudication process takes part between two adversaries who have a conflict of
opinion and a neutral third party who moderates and adjudicates the conflict. The adver-
saries and third party will below be called plaintiff , defendant and adjudicator, respectively.
Typically, a process consists of two parts, a argumentation phase in which the adversaries
plea their case before the adjudicator and respond to each other, and a decision phase in
which the adjudicator (whether judge or jury) decides the conflict. In the argumentation
phase the adversaries make, dispute, concede and retract claims, and provide arguments for
their claims or against arguments of the other adversary. The adjudicator can have various
roles during the argumentation phase, such as monitoring whether the adversaries obey the
procedural rules, defining the scope of the dispute by deciding what may and may not be
taken into account (such as whether evidence is admissible), allocating the burden of proof
and regulating turntaking and termination.
Burden of proof is one of the central notions of legal procedure. In the literature it
has been argued that the burden of proof can be allocated by formalising legal rules with
the proper knowledge representation techniques from nonmonotonic logic; see e.g. Sartor
(1995). Although this approach works under certain assumptions, it fails to capture that in
legal procedure the allocation of the burden of proof is ultimately a matter of decision by
the adjudicator, and therefore cannot be determined by logical form alone. Any full model
of reasoning under burden of proof should leave room for such decisions, and this is what I
shall do, by incorporating a special speech act for allocations of the burden of proof.
Moreover, any full model of reasoning under burden of proof should take into account
the well-known distinction between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion;
see e.g. Strong (1992, pp. 425-6). In legal terms the burden of production specifies which
party has to offer evidence on an issue at different points in a proceeding while the burden
of persuasion specifies which party loses on an issue if the evidence is balanced. In the di-
alogue model presented in this paper the burden of production is relevant when a statement
is disputed: it then specifies whether the party who made the statement must support it with
an argument or whether the party who disputed it must provide an argument why it does
not hold. Accordingly, in the present model the burden of production is to be allocated in
the argumentation phase by means of a special speech act. The burden of persuasion, on the
other hand, becomes relevant in the decision phase, when the adjudicator assesses the argu-
ments presented by the parties. This assessment involves two aspects: whether the argument
is strong enough to support the claim in the absence of counterarguments (internal validity)
and whether it survives the competition with its counterarguments (dialectical validity). In
the present model the adjudicator verifies the burden of persuasion in the decision phase by
moving arguments, including priority arguments.
Of course, adjudication procedures can vary considerably. Turntaking and termination
can be regulated in many different ways, retracting claims can be allowed or not, the adju-
dicator can be more or less free in assessing the evidence, and so on. Also, procedures can
differ on whether the adversaries are allowed to make statements pertaining to admissibility
of evidence, procedural correctness or burden of proof. The purpose of this paper is to model
a fairly typical but not too complicated procedure and to focus in particular on rationality
aspects of procedures instead of on their contingent legal aspects. This procedure will now
be illustrated with an example.
42.2 A motivating example
Our formal model of adjudication should capture dialogues like the following one (which,
although imaginary, is in some elements based on Dutch civil law). It contains an initial
claim, decisions about the burden of production and admissibility of evidence, arguments,
counterarguments and a priority argument. References to legal rules will for convenience be
abbreviated as indexed letters r.
- Plaintiff : I claim that defendant owes me 500 euro.
- Defendant: I dispute plaintiff’s claim.
- Plaintiff : Defendant owes me 500 euro by r1 since we concluded a valid sales contract, I
delivered but defendant did not pay.
- Defendant: I concede that plaintiff delivered and I did not pay, but I dispute that we have
valid contract.
- Plaintiff : We have a valid contract by r2 since this document is a contract signed by us.
- Defendant: I dispute that this is my signature.
- Plaintiff : Why?
- Judge: By r3 the party who invokes a signature under a document which is not an avidavit
has the burden to prove that it is authentic when this is disputed, so plaintiff must prove that
this is defendant’s signature.
- Plaintiff : This is defendant’s signature since it looks just like these three signatures of
which we know they are defendant’s.
- Defendant: But it does not look like this signature, which is also mine. Besides, another
reason why we have no contract is that I was insane when I agreed so r4 applies, which
makes Section r2 inapplicable.
Plaintiff : I dispute that you were insane.
Defendant: My insanity is proven by this court’s document, which declares me insane.
- Plaintiff : I dispute that this is a court’s document.
- Judge: Plaintiff, since the document looks like a court’s document, i.e., like an avidavit, by
r5 the burden is on you to prove that it is not.
- Plaintiff : This lab report proves that the document is forged.
Judge: This report is inadmissible as evidence by r6 since I received it after the written ar-
gumentation phase.
Plaintiff : Nevermind, even if defendant was insane, this could not be known to me during
the negotiations, so r4 does not apply by r7.
Defendant: Why could my insanity not be known to you?
Plaintiff : Since you looked normal all the time.
Judge (deciding the dispute): I am convinced by plaintiff’s evidence that defendant’s signa-
ture under the contract is authentic. Yet I cannot grant plaintiff’s claim since the fact that
defendant looked normal during the negotiations is insufficient to conclude that defendant’s
insanity could not be known to plaintiff: he might have known if he had checked the court’s
register. Therefore I deny plaintiff his claim.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a precise account of all natural-language aspects
of such dialogues. To focus on the essence, the formal model will largely abstract from the
formalisation of the arguments, counterarguments and priority arguments. This is not a se-
rious limitation, since it is by now well-known in the literature on nonmonotonic logic how
these things can be formalised (see e.g. Prakken and Sartor (2002) for an overview). Fur-
thermore, it is not my aim to account for the fact that often elements of arguments are left
5implicit. I believe that this issue is far from trivial and therefore deserves a separate study.
Accordingly, I will in this paper only allow fully explicit arguments.
2.3 Aspects to be modelled
I now list in more detail the activities to be modelled.
The adversaries’ acts:
– Stating, disputing, retracting and conceding claims.
– Stating arguments and counterarguments.
The adjudicator’s acts:
– Deciding about procedural correctness of moves (which includes admissibility of evi-
dence).
– Deciding about the burden of production.
– Deciding about termination of a dispute.
– Deciding whether a party has met its burden of persuasion. This involves deciding about
the following issues:
– whether an argument is able to support its conclusion even in the absence of coun-
terarguments (internal validity);
– whether the argument survives competition with its counterarguments (dialectical
validity).
Some of these acts will be modelled with special speech acts (viz. ruling moves legally
inadmissible, allocating the burden of production and terminating the dialogue), while the
internal and dialectical assessment of arguments will be modelled as specific ways to move
arguments.
3 An overview of the formal tools
In this section the formal tools used in this paper will be introduced.
3.1 Formal dialectics and dialogue games
Procedural AI & Law models have largely been based on a branch of argumentation theory
and philosophical logic called ‘formal dialectics’ (Hamblin; 1971; Mackenzie; 1979; Wal-
ton and Krabbe; 1995), which formalises rules for dialogues involving argumentation, in
particular persuasion dialogues. The main aim of dialogue systems is to define conventions
for coherent discourse, where an utterance in a dialogue is regarded as coherent if it con-
tributes to the goal of the dialogue (Carlson; 1983). The goal of adjudication dialogues can
be described as fair and effective dispute resolution.
Most work on formal dialectics takes a game-theoretic approach to dialogues, where
speech acts are viewed as moves in a game and rules for when these moves are allowed
are formulated as rules of the game. More specifically, formal dialogue games have a topic
language Lt with a logic L , and a communication language Lc with a protocol P. The
protocol specifies the allowed moves at each point in a dialogue. A dialogue system also has
6effect rules, which specify the effects of utterances on the participants’ commitments, and
termination and outcome rules.
AI & Law models have extended dialogue games for persuasion with the possibility
of counterargument. While in the systems of formal dialectics the only way to challenge
an argument is by disputing its premises, in the AI & Law models a party can challenge
an argument even if s/he accepts all premises, viz. by stating a counterargument. In other
words, while in the argumentation-theoretic models the underlying logic is deductive, in the
AI & Law systems it is defeasible.
A formal underpinning for the latter is provided by the study of argument games in
artificial intelligence, to which I now turn.
3.2 Logics for defeasible argumentation
The idea that legal reasoning is defeasible is generally accepted in AI & Law and is increas-
ingly accepted in legal philosophy (Peczenik; 1996; Hage; 1997; Sartor; 2005). Here I will
simply take this idea for granted. In formalising it, I will take an argumentation approach,
since the dialectical flavour of this approach fits well with protocols for dialogue and pro-
cedure. Providing grounds and evidence will be modelled as constructing arguments for a
claim, and attacking grounds and providing counterevidence will be modelled as construct-
ing counterarguments. Three ways of attacking arguments will be assumed, viz. attacking a
premise with an argument for its negation (premise attack), attacking the conclusion with an
argument for its negation (rebutting attack) and attacking the support relation between the
premises and the conclusion (undercutting attack). The latter two attacks can also be targeted
at intermediate conclusions or inference steps of an argument. Finally, adjudication will also
be modelled as constructing arguments, typically as constructing priority arguments, which
are arguments that break ties between conflicting arguments.
Formal systems for defeasible argumentation, or argumentation systems for short, have
been developed in the past twenty years in artificial intelligence as models of common-sense
reasoning. (See Prakken and Vreeswijk (2002) for an overview.) These systems formalise
defeasible reasoning as the construction and comparison of arguments for and against cer-
tain conclusions. They define how arguments can be constructed from a given body of in-
formation, how such arguments can be attacked by counterarguments, and how conflicting
arguments can be compared in terms of given criteria for comparison. To all arguments that
can be constructed a so-called dialectical status is then assigned. Typically this status is de-
fined in terms of three classes: the ‘winning’ or justified arguments, the ‘losing’ or overruled
arguments, and the ‘ties’, i.e., the defensible arguments, which are involved in an irresolv-
able conflict. In this paper I will especially be interested in determining whether an argument
is justified, since the main aim of an adjudication procedure is to decide whether a justified
argument exists for a claim.
Argumentation logics can be defined with fixpoint definitions but also in the dialectical
form of argument games (cf. Loui; 1998). Such games model defeasible reasoning as a
dispute between a proponent and opponent of a statement. In this paper the argument game
of Prakken and Sartor (1997) as modified by Prakken (2001a) will be used. The game of
Prakken and Sartor (1997) is defined as follows. Let ‘A defeats B’ stand for ‘A attacks B and
is not worse than B’ and note that two conflicting arguments defeat each other if they are
equally strong or their relative strength is unknown. In the game proponent starts with an
argument that he wants to prove justified and then each player must either defeat the other
player’s previous argument or move a priority argument that stops the previous argument
7from defeating its target. Moreover, proponent is not allowed to repeat an argument in attack
on the same argument, since if opponent had a reply the first time, she will also have a reply
the next time. A player wins if the other player has run out of moves. The initial argument
is provably justified if the proponent has a winning strategy in this game.
Note that under these rules the proponent will win only if his arguments strictly defeat
opponent’s counterarguments, that is, only if he moves arguments that are not defeated by
their target. In other words, the proponent loses when the evidence is balanced, so he in
fact has the burden of persuasion for all his claims. This does not agree with the fact that
in the law the burden of persuasion can be distributed over the parties. Accordingly, in
Prakken (2001a) I modified the argument game by making the proponent and opponent
roles relative to statements. Each player (plaintiff or defendant) now has proponent role for
the statements for which they have the burden of persuasion, while they have opponent role
for statements for which the other player has the burden of persuasion. Assignments of the
burden of persuasion are simply modelled as additional input to the logic. It is this version
of the game that I will use in the present paper.
Clearly, the idea of argument games fits well with formal dialectics. However, for present
purposes they also have an important limitation: they are static in that, being proof theories
for logics, they operate on a fixed body of information from which conclusions are drawn.
By contrast, in argumentation dialogues the information on which the outcome of a dialogue
is determined is usually created dynamically during a dialogue. For this reason I showed in
Prakken (2005) how argument games can be embedded in dialogue systems for persuasion.
The present task is to extend the (two-player) persuasion model of that paper to a (three-
player) model of adjudication. To this end the main elements of Prakken (2005) will be
summarised next.
3.3 A framework for two-player persuasion dialogue
In Prakken (2005) a framework for specifying two-party persuasion dialogues is presented,
which is then instantiated with some example protocols. Below the main elements of the
instantiation used in this paper are summarised. Readers in need of illustration may wish
wish to look ahead to Section 5.2, where the example of Section 2.2 is visualised.
A main motivation of the framework is to ensure focus of dialogues while yet allowing
for freedom to move alternative replies and to postpone replies. This is achieved with two
main features of the framework.
The first is an explicit reply structure on the communication language. Each dialogue
move except the initial one replies to one earlier move in the dialogue of the other party (its
target). Thus a dialogue can be regarded in two ways: as a sequence (reflecting the order in
which the moves are made) and as a tree (reflecting the reply relations between the moves).
Each replying move is either an attacker or a surrender. For instance, a claim p move can
be attacked with a why p move and surrendered with a concede p move; and a why p move
can be attacked with an argue A move where A is an argument with conclusion p, and
surrendered with a retract p move. When s is a surrendering and s′ is an attacking reply to
s′′, we say that s′ is an attacking counterpart of s.
The second idea is that at each stage of a dialogue, each dialogue move has a dialogical
status, which is either in or out. It is recursively defined as follows, exploiting the tree
structure of dialogues. A move is in if it is surrendered or else if all its attacking replies
are out. (This implies that a move without replies is in). And a move is out if it has a reply
that is in. (Actually, this has to be refined to allow that some premises of an argument are
8conceded while others are disputed; see Prakken (2005) for the details). This allows the
definition of the current winner of a dialogue: a dialogue is (currently) won by the plaintiff
if its initial move is in while it is (currently) won by the defendant otherwise. Figures 1 and 2
in Section 5.2 illustrate the reply structure of dialogues and the dialogical status of moves.
As for dialogue structure, the framework allows for all kinds of variations. The instan-
tiation used here is very liberal in its structural aspects: essentially, both players can speak
whenever they like, except that they cannot speak at the same time. Also, they may reply to
any earlier move of the other player instead of having to reply to the last such move, and
they may move alternative replies to the same move, possibly even in the same turn (a turn
is a sequence of moves of one player). Other protocols defined in Prakken (2005) impose
restrictions on these points; since dialogue structure is not our present concern, they will not
be discussed here.
The framework largely abstracts from the topic language and its logic but arguments
are assumed to be trees of deductive and/or defeasible inferences. Recall that in the present
paper the logic of Prakken (2001a) will be assumed. To keep things simple, formal details
of language and logic will be omitted.
In Prakken (2005) dialogues are between a proponent P and opponent O of a single
dialogue topic t ∈ Lt . However, to allow for distributions of the burden of persuasion over the
parties, in the present paper I adopt Prakken (2001a)’s distinction between dialogue parties
(plaintiff (pi) and defendant (δ )) and their dialectical roles towards particular statements
(proponent and opponent). The dialectical roles are specified in a function that at each stage
of a dialogue assigns a (possibly empty) set of statements to each player for which they have
the burden of persuasion. Each such set is consistent and is such that if one player has the
burden of persuasion for ϕ , no other player has the burden of persuasion for either ϕ or ¬ϕ .
Now the protocol is based on the following ideas.
The communication language Lc assumed in this paper is specified in Table 1. In this
table, ϕ is from Lt and arguments A and B are well-formed arguments fromL .
Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim ϕ why ϕ concede ϕ
why ϕ argue A (conc(A) = ϕ) retract ϕ
argue A why ϕ (ϕ ∈ prem(A)), concede ϕ




Table 1 A communication language for persuasion
A protocol for Lc is defined in terms of the notion of a dialogue, which in turn is defined
with the notion of a move.
Definition 1 (Dialogues)
– The set M of moves is defined as N×{pi,δ}× Lc ×N, where the four elements of a
move m are denoted by, respectively:
– id(m), the identifier of the move,
– pl(m), the player of the move,
– s(m), the speech act performed in the move,
9– t(m), the target of the move.
– The set of dialogues, denoted by M≤∞, is the set of all sequences m1, . . . ,mi, . . . from M
such that
– each ith element in the sequence has identifier i,
– t(m) = 0 iff m = m1 or for no s ∈ Lc it holds that s(m) is a reply to s in Lc;
– If t(m) 6= 0 then t(m) = i for some mi preceding m in the sequence.
The set of finite dialogues, denoted by M<∞, is the set of all finite sequences that sat-
isfy these conditions. For any dialogue d = m1, . . . ,mn, . . ., the sequence m1, . . . ,mi is
denoted by di, where d0 denotes the empty dialogue.
When t(m) = id(m′) I say that m replies to m′ in d and that m′ is the target of m in d. Abusing
notation I sometimes let t(m) denote a move instead of just its identifier. When s(m) is an
attacking (surrendering) reply to s(m′) I also say that m is an attacking (surrendering) reply
to m′.
Protocols are in Prakken (2005) defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Protocols) A protocol on M is a set P ⊆ M<∞ satisfying the condition that
whenever d is in P, so are all initial sequences that d starts with.
A partial function Pr : M<∞ −→P(M) is derived from P as follows:
– Pr(d) = undefined whenever d 6∈ P;
– Pr(d) = {m | d,m ∈ P} otherwise.
The elements of dom(Pr) (the domain of Pr) are called the legal finite dialogues. The ele-
ments of Pr(d) are called the moves allowed after d. If d is a legal dialogue and Pr(d) = /0,
then d is said to be a terminated dialogue.
These protocol rules for move legality should not be confused with the rules of legal proce-
dure that are checked by a judge. The protocol rules are rational rules for any adjudication
dialogue while a judge only checks the contingent rules of a specific procedure, such as the
rules on admissibility of evidence. See Vreeswijk (2000) for a dialogue protocol in which
the protocol rules can themselves be debated within the protocol.
All protocols are further assumed to satisfy the following basic conditions for all moves
mi and all legal finite dialogues d.
If m ∈ Pr(d), then:
– R1: pl(m) ∈ T (d).2
– R2: If t(m) 6= 0 then s(m) is a reply to s(t(m)) according to Lc.
– R3: If m replies to m′, then pl(m) 6= pl(m′).
– R4: If there is an m′ in d such that t(m) = t(m′) then s(m) 6= s(m′).
– R5: For any m′ ∈ d that surrenders to t(m), m is not an attacking counterpart of m′.
Rule R1 says that the player of a move must be to move. Rules R2-R4 formalise the idea of a
dialogue as a move-reply structure that allows for alternative replies. Rule R5 says that once a
move is surrendered, it may not be attacked any more. Note that these five protocol rules only
state necessary conditions for legality of moves. They can be completed in many ways with
further conditions, for instance, to prevent circular dialogues (Mackenzie; 1979; Walton and
Krabbe; 1995) but to focus on the essence such rules will be left undiscussed here. However,
two additional rules are assumed in this paper. The first says that each dialogue begins with
either a claim or an argument and the second constrains the moving on arguments.
2 T (d) denotes the player(s) whose turn it is to move in d.
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– R6: If d = d0 then s(m) is of the form claim ϕ or argue A.
– R7: If an argue A move replies to an argue B move then
1. if A is moved in proponent role then the player who moves it has not already moved
A in the same line of dialogue; and
2. if A does not defeat B then B replies to an argue C move such that B defeats C and
A is a priority argument that stops B from defeating C.
In rule R7 a dialogue line is a single branch of the dialogue tree induced by the reply relations
between moves. The purpose of this rule is to build the argument game of Prakken (2001a)
into the protocol.
The commitment rules of a dialogue system define the effects of a move on the players’
propositional commitments. For instance, a claim makes a player committed to its content
and a retraction terminates such commitment. In several dialogue games commitments are
an important ingredient (see e.g. Walton and Krabbe (1995)). However, in the present ap-
proach their role is largely performed by the reply structure on the communication language
and the notion of dialogical status. Therefore, they will not be further discussed here.
As for turntaking it was noted above that both players can speak whenever they like,
except that they cannot speak at the same time. Termination was in Definition 2 implicitly
defined as the situation where the player(s) to move cannot make a legal move. In Section 4
this ‘mathematical’ definition of termination will be reconciled with the nature of adjudica-
tion.
The link with the underlying argumentation logic is made in terms of a so-called di-
alectical graph, which records all the arguments stepwise constructed during the dialogue,
as well as their defeat relations. The idea is that during a persuasion dialogue this graph
is extended by stating arguments for claims, by stating counterarguments and by extending
arguments with arguments for their premises. The full definitions can be found in Prakken
(2005). Figure 3 in Section 5.2 provides an illustration.
Ideally, the outcome of the dialogue and of the dialectical graph correspond in the fol-
lowing way. The initial move of a dialogue is in just in case the ‘defended part’ of the
dialectical graph, that is, the set of arguments of which no premise is disputed, makes an
argument for the initial claim justified. In Prakken (2005) it is proven that this holds on two
conditions: that no surrenders are moved (since a player can, for instance, concede or retract
a claim even if he logically does not have to) and if the dialogue is ’logically completed’, i.e.,
if no new relevant arguments can be moved in the dialogue without stating new premises.
4 Adapting the dialogue system to adjudication
In this section the above framework for two-player persuasion dialogues will be extended to
adjudication. A third player, the adjudicator, will be added, some new speech acts introduced
and the protocol, turntaking and termination rules will be adapted.
4.1 Overview
I first sketch how an adjudication dialogue according to the new framework generally evolves.
Each dialogue starts with the argumentation phase and does so with a claim of the plaintiff,
who takes proponent role with respect to this claim. During the dispute about the claim the
adversaries together implicitly build an argument graph in the manner defined above. More
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precisely, when a claim is disputed, the adversaries can exchange arguments and counterar-
guments and can dispute their premises. Sometimes, disagreements are resolved peacefully
by conceding or retracting claims. The adversaries can also try to shift the burden of pro-
duction on the other adversary by replying to a disputing of ϕ with disputing the opposite of
ϕ . When an adversary has ended his turn, the turn shifts to the adjudicator. The adjudicator
first decides on the procedural correctness of the moves made in the previous turn. Then he
can allocate the burden of production of propositions that have been disputed and finally
he decides whether to terminate the argumentation phase. If the dialogue continues, then
the turn shifts to the current loser at the end of the adjudicator’s turn. In the decision phase
only the adjudicator can move and until termination he can only move arguments, includ-
ing counterarguments and priority arguments, to determine whether the various burdens of
persuasion have been met. These burdens are assumed to have been detemined by the judge
between the argumentation and decision phase and are given as input to the decision phase.
(The model could be extended with the means for the judge to express her reasons for these
allocations as arguments; this can be done by replacing the logic of Prakken (2001a) as the
underlying logic of Lt with the one of Prakken and Sartor (2007), in which arguments about
the burden of persuasion can be expressed.) When the decision phase terminates, the winner
is determined by the dialogical status of plaintiff’s main claim.
4.2 The new dialogue game
A dialogue now takes place between three players. The set Players = {pi,δ ,α}, where pi
and δ are the adversaries and α the adjudicator. The variable p ranges over all three players,
while the variable a ranges over the adversaries. If a is an adversary, then a denotes the other
adversary. So pi = δ and δ = pi .
As for the the communication language, the addition of an adjudicator requires some
new speech acts. Firstly, with respect to turntaking the idea now is that after a turn of an
adversary the turn shifts to the adjudicator, who must decide whether the moves made by
the speaker were legally admissible and whether there is reason to make an explicit decision
about the burden of production. Therefore, the end of an adversaries’ turn must now be
recognisable by the adjudicator so all turns must now end with a pass speech act. Secondly,
the adjudicator has the power to terminate a dialogue, which he can do with a terminate
speech act. These two speech acts do not reply to and cannot be replied-to by other speech
acts. According to Definition 1 above their target therefore is the dummy value 0.
Next, from now on the speech act why ϕ can also be used in attack of a why ¬ϕ move,
to express that the speaker claims that the burden of production for the opposite of ϕ is on
the hearer (an idea taken from Prakken et al. (2005) and originally due to Chris Reed). More
generally, the second why move can dispute the ‘complement’ of the first disputation. To
capture this the notation −ϕ is introduced, which denotes the complement of ϕ: when ϕ is
not a negation its complement is ¬ϕ , otherwise, its complement deletes the negation sign.
So, for instance, the complement of p is ¬p and the complement of ¬p is p.
Finally, new speech acts are needed for deciding about the burden of production and
about procedural correctness of a move, viz. burden(ϕ, p) and illegal m. Here burden(ϕ, p)
means that player p has the burden of production for ϕ and illegal m means that move m
violates the rules of legal procedure. (Recall that these rules are not the same as the one
of the dialogue game.) An illegal move can be made in reply to any other move while a
burden(ϕ, p) move can only be made in reply to a why ϕ move.
The resulting communication language is displayed in Figure 2. Next, the following
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Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim ϕ why ϕ concede ϕ
illegal m




argue A why ϕ (ϕ ∈ prem(A)), concede ϕ
argue B (ϕ ∈ prem(A) or
ϕ = conc(A))
illegal m
concede ϕ illegal m





Table 2 A communication language for adjudication dialogues
protocol rules are added to rules R1-R7. They distinguish two phases of a dialogue: the
argumentation phase is the phase before a terminate move has been moved and the decision
phase is the remaining phase.
– R8: A terminate, burden and illegal move may only be moved by the adjudicator. In
the argumentation phase the adjudicator only moves burden, illegal, pass and terminate
moves. In the decision phase the adjudicator only moves argue and terminate moves.
– R9: In the argumentation phase each of the adjudicator’s moves replies to a move from
the previous turn, except when R10 applies.
– R10: If the previous turn contains a why −ϕ attack m on a why ϕ move m′ and the
adjudicator does not rule m illegal then he attacks either m or m′ with a burden move.
– R11: Each burden move assigns the burden of production to the speaker of the move’s
target.
– R12: A move with an illegal or burden reply may not be replied-to any more.
– R13: After the first terminate move no move by an adversary is legal. After a second
terminate move no move is legal.
– R14: If the current winner cannot become the current loser at a later stage, the adjudicator
can only move a terminate move.
Rule R8 captures the differences between the argumentation and the decision phase. Rules R9
and R10 implement the idea that issues of move legality and burden of production are dealt
with as soon as they arise. Rule R11 ensures that the player to whom the burden of production
is allocated is the current loser, so that he has to support the disputed statement with an
argument. Rule R12 captures that decisions on move legality and the burden of production
are irreversible and undisputable. Rule R13 marks the shift from the argumentation to the
decision phase. Finally, R14 in fact captures that if the adversaries have peacefully resolved
the dispute, the adjudicator cannot change the outcome and has to terminate the dispute.
This is so since the only way in which plaintiff, respectively, defendant can become the
permanent current winner is if defendant concedes, respectively plaintiff retracts the main
claim.
The new turntaking rules are as follows.
13
– T1: plaintiff starts a dispute.
– T2: In the argumentation phase the turn only shifts after a pass move.
– T3: After a pass move by an adversary the turn shifts to the adjudicator.
– T4: After a pass move by the adjudicator the turn shifts to the current loser.
– T5: In the decision phase it is always the adjudicator’s turn.
Termination was in Definition 2 implicitly defined as the situation where the player(s) to
move cannot make a legal move. However, in legal settings a dispute is often arbitrarily
ended after a fixed number of turns or by the adjudicator’s intervention. This is why the
locution terminate was added to Lc and two further protocol conditions were added that
only the third party can move this locution and that after such a move no other move is
legal.
Finally, the outcome rule says that the winner of a dispute is the current winner at
termination of the decision phase.
4.3 The adjudicator’s options in the decision phase
Technically speaking the decision phase does not fit the framework of this paper and Prakken
(2005) since it is a monologue and since the adjudicator can reply to his own moves. (This
makes sense since sometimes a decision takes the form of an internal debate, such as “in
general, in cases like these p holds but in this case there is an exception”.) However, most
rules of our framework will also be assumed to hold for the decision phase. To this end
the requirement of the general framework that players cannot reply to their own moves is
dropped for the decision phase. Next, recall that the purpose of the decision phase is to
decide the dispute. This involves deciding about a number of issues. Let us see how the new
dialogue game enables the adjudicator to express these decisions.
– Deciding whether a non-disputed and non-attacked premise of an argument holds. If not,
the adjudicator moves a premise-attacking counterargument, otherwise no response to
the premise is needed.
– Deciding whether an argument is internally valid, that is, whether it is acceptable if not
attacked by counterarguments. If it is not, then the adjudicator expresses this by moving
an undercutting counterargument, otherwise the following decisions must be made.
– Deciding whether there is reason to move additional counterarguments to internally
valid arguments.
– Deciding whether an argument is dialectically valid, i.e., whether it survives the com-
petition with its internally valid counterarguments. This is typically decided by priority
arguments.
Note that all these decisions can be made by either remaining silent or moving an argument.
5 Examples
In this section the new dialogue game will be illustrated with some examples. As for no-
tation, the target of a move will be indicated in square brackets and argue moves will be
displayed as ‘conclusion since premises’. Initially, I assume that the plaintiff has the burden
of persuasion for all statements made by any player; at the end of this section I will briefly
consider a situation where defendant also has the burden of persuasion for some claims.
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5.1 Abstract examples
Let us first illustrate the working of the system with a few symbolic examples.
pi1: claim p
pi2: pass
The turn shifts to the adjudicator, whose only legal moves are to rule pi1 illegal, to termi-
nate the dialogue or to pass. Initial claims are hardly ever illegal and it does not make much
sense to terminate a dialogue after the first move, so the adjudicator passes. Since plaintiff





The adjudicator must now decide about legality of δ4. He implicitly rules it legal by moving
no illegal δ4 reply. Next the adjudicator must decide about the burden of production for p.
Note that at this point pi1 is out so plaintiff is the current loser, which means that ‘by default’
the burden of production is on him. The adjudicator sees no reason to place it on defen-
dant nor to terminate the dialogue, so he passes. Note that if defendant had not disputed but
conceded p, move pi1 would have been made in for ever, so if the adjudicator had ruled the
concession legal, he would have been forced to terminate the dialogue by rule R14.
α6: pass
Plaintiff now has the choice to accept the default burden of production and defend p with
an argument or to try to place the burden on defendant. Let us assume he accepts the default
burden of production.
pi7[δ4]: p since q
pi8: pass
α9: pass
Now an interesting situation has arisen. Since at this point defendant is the current loser,
plaintiff has with pi7 managed to shift the burden of proof on her in a certain sense. To
avoid losing in the end, defendant must do something. She could dispute pi7’s premise but
she could also move a counterargument against pi7’s argument. In both cases the defendant
becomes the current winner so she has managed to shift this new sense of burden of proof
back to plaintiff. This type of proof burden is sometimes called the tactical burden of proof
(see Prakken and Sartor (2006) for a more detailed discussion and references to the jurispru-
dential literature). In the context of a legal proceeding it is the burden to do something that
makes oneself the likely winner of the proceeding if the resulting situation were the final
situation on the basis of which the proceeding is decided. In terms of the present dialogue
game it is the burden to do something that makes oneself the current winner. Note that the
tactical burden of proof is, unlike the burdens of production and persuasion, not a matter of
law or judicial decision but is induced by the dialogue rules and the (nonmonotonic) logic.
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Suppose defendant decides to dispute pi7’s premise.
δ10[pi7]: why q
δ11: pass
Let us now examine the two ways in which the burden of production can become the subject
of explicit dispute. In our dialogue game the burden of production concerning a statement is
by default on the one who made that statement in that if the other player disputes it and the
judge remains silent, the first player is the current loser. In our example this is the situation
after α6. There are two ways in which the burden of production for a statement (in our case
q) can be placed on the one who disputed it. The first is that the adjudicator directly after the
why p move decides that the burden to prove ¬q is on defendant.
α12[δ10]: burden(¬q,δ )
α13: pass
Since α13 has made δ10 out, defendant is the current loser. To become the current win-
ner she can move an undercutting or rebutting counterargument to pi7 or she can fulfill the
burden of production for ¬q by moving a premise attack on pi7 with an argument for ¬q.
Assume next that the adjudicator instead wants to wait and see if plaintiff accepts the
default burden of production for q.
α ′12: pass
Suppose plaintiff instead tries to place the burden of production on defendant.
pi13[δ10]: why ¬q
pi14: pass
Then the adjudicator can still decide to shift the burden to defendant with
α15[δ10]: burden(¬q,δ )
after which defendant has the same options as after α13.
This example illustrates that if the burden of production for a premise is placed on the party
that disputed it, that party can only fulfill it by moving a premise-attacking counterargument.
5.2 The motivating example formalised
Let us next formalise the example of Section 2.2. For simplicity, the pass moves are left
implicit.
pi1: claim owe 500
δ2[pi1]: why owe 500
pi3[δ2]: owe 500 since contract and delivered and ¬ paid and r1
δ4[pi3]: concede delivered
δ5[pi3]: concede ¬ paid
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δ6[pi3]: why contract
Again the turn shifts to plaintiff. Since he knows the general rule of Dutch civil proce-
dure that the one who claims that a legal relation exists has to prove it, he again accepts the
default burden of production.
pi7[δ6]: contract since document and signed and r2
δ8[pi7]: why signed
Now plaintiff tries to place the burden of producing evidence that there is something wrong
with the signatures on defendant.
pi9[δ8]: why ¬ signed
The adjudicator implicitly rules pi9 legal by moving no illegal reply and is then forced by
rule R10 to decide about the burden of production with respect to ‘signed by us’, since the
burden is now in dispute. If he wants to assign it to defendant then he must reply to δ8 with
a burden(¬ signed by us,δ ) move. But in agreement with Dutch civil procedure he instead
allocates the burden to plaintiff, which makes plaintiff the current loser so the turn shifts
back to him.
α10[pi9]: burden(signed,pi)
Note that the present formalism does not allow the adjudicator to express his reasons why
the burden of production is on plaintiff. Such a possibility could be added but for simplicity
I will not pursue this here.
pi11[δ8]: signed since similar-to-3
Plaintiff has fulfilled his burden of production so the tactical burden of proof now auto-
matically shifts to defendant, who has to provide counterevidence in the form of a rebutting
counterargument.
δ12[pi11]: ¬ signed since ¬ similar-to-1
Afer this rebuttal defendant also plays out her second attack on plaintiff’s main argument,
backtracking to pi7:
δ13[pi7]: ¬ r2 since insane and r4
pi14[δ13]: why insane
δ15[pi14]: insane since court’s doc and declares insane
pi16[δ15]: why court’s doc
At this point the adjudicator allocates the burden of production to plaintiff, since by Dutch
law something that looks like an avidavit is presumed to be an avidavit. This presumption
can only be overturned by counterevidence.
α17[pi16]: burden(¬ court’s doc,pi)
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Plaintiff provides counterevidence by stating a premise attack on δ15.
pi18[δ15]: ¬ court’s doc since lab report and says that forged
The adjudicator now rules the lab report inadmissible, after which the turn shifts back to
plaintiff.
α19[pi18]: illegal pi18
Plaintiff now backtracks to δ13, arguing that there is an exception to the exception.
pi20[δ13]: ¬ r4 since could not know and r7
δ21[pi20]: why could not know
pi22[δ21]: could not know since looked normal
α23: terminate
The adjudicator terminates the argumentation phase of the dispute and enters the decision
phase, in which he must decide about the internal and dialectical validity of the various ar-
guments. Recall that at this point it is simply assumed that the burdens of persuasion are
known (the judge allocates these burdens between the argumentation and decision phase by
applying the relevant procedural rules).
The adjudicator first rules that plaintiff has met his burden of persuasion for ‘signed by
us’ by moving a priority argument against δ12.
α24[δ12]: pi11 > δ12 since convinced by pi11
This priority argument stops δ12’s argument from defeating pi11’s argument, so the latter
has been ruled dialectically valid. Next the adjudicator rules plaintiff’s argument that he
could not know about defendant’s insanity internally invalid by moving an undercutter.
α25[pi22]: pi22 is not conclusive since check register
Then the adjudicator terminates the decision phase, thus implicitly ruling all remaining ar-
guments internally valid by moving no undercutters and ruling them dialectically valid by
moving no other counterarguments.
α26: terminate
Defendant is the current winner so the adjudicator has in fact ruled that defendant wins
the dispute.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 display, respectively, the dialogue in reply form (in two parts) and the
dialectical graph created during the dialogue. In Figures 1 and 2 a solid box means that a
move is in and a dotted box that it is out in the dialogue game. As explained in Section 3.3
above, the dialectical graph records all arguments that were stepwise constructed during the
dialogue, as well as their defeat relations. In Figure 3 a solid box means that the argument
is justified and a dotted box that it is overruled relative to the set of all arguments contained
in the graph.
The dialectical graph in fact contains a winning strategy for plaintiff in the embedded




pi3: owe500 since contract, delivered, ¬ paid, r1
δ4: concede delivered δ5: concede ¬ paid δ6: why contract
pi7: contract since document, signed, r2
δ8: why signed
pi9: why ¬ signed
α10: burden(signed,pi)
pi11: signed since similarto3
δ12: ¬ signed since ¬ similarto1
α24: pi11 > δ12 since convinced
δ13: ¬ r2 since insane, r4
See Figure 2
Fig. 1 A dialogue tree (part 1)
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See Figure 1
δ13: ¬ r2 since insane, r4
pi14: why insane
δ15: insane since court, declares
pi16: why court
α17: burden(¬ doc,pi)
pi18: ¬ court since lab, ‘forged’
α19: illegal pi18
pi20: ¬r4 since couldnotknow, r7
δ21: why couldnotknow
pi22: couldnotknow since normal
α25: undercut since register
Fig. 2 A dialogue tree (part 2)
defendant’s attacks on his main argument he has a winning counterattack and defendant can-
not construct other counterarguments without introducing new premises. At first sight, this
would seem to be at odds with the outcome of the dialogue. However, plaintiff’s argument
pi18 was ruled illegal by the adjudicator so its premises must be disregarded in verifying cor-
respondence. The remaining graph instead displays a winning strategy for defendant on the
basis of all defended statements made during the dialogue, which agrees with the outcome
of the dialogue.
Let us finally briefly illustrate distributions of the burden of persuasion over the ad-
versaries. Assume that defendant has the burden of persuasion for her claim that there is
something wrong with the signatures of the contract (δ12). In that case, plaintiff can repeat
his argument pi11 in attack on δ12, since in the embedded argument game the non-repetition
rule now holds for defendant as regards ‘¬ signed’. Assume the dialogue then proceeds as
above with δ13. If the adjudicator still assesses the argument for and against ‘signed’ as he
did above, then in the decision phase he does not have to move a priority argument against




















Fig. 3 A dialectical graph
6 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to show how current dialogical models of legal pro-
cedure and persuasion dialogue can be extended to models of adjudication dialogue with
a realistic role of the adjudicator. To this end, a formal model has been developed of an
artificial but fairly typical adjudication procedure, using tools from argumentation theory
(dialogue games) and artificial intelligence (logics for defeasible argumentation). The main
feature of the model is a division into an argumentation phase, where the adversaries plea
their case and the adjudicator has a largely mediating role, and a decision phase, where the
adjudicator decides the dispute on the basis of the things put forward in the argumentation
phase.
The model allows for decisions on legal-procedural correctness of dialogue utterances
in the argumentation phase, such as on admissibility of evidence. The model also respects
the legal distinction between the burdens of production and persuasion. It allows for explicit
decisions on the burden of production in the argumentation phase and leaves room for veri-
fying the burden of persuasion in the decision phase. The model also captures the notion of
tactical burden of proof, by way of the notion of dialogical status of moves. If an adversary
succeeds in changing the dialogical status of the main claim or argument his or her way,
then s/he thereby shifts the tactical burden on the other player to change that status. Unlike
the burdens of production and persuasion, which are imposed by law or the adjudicator, the
tactical burden is automatically induced by the defeasible nature of the underlying logic and
the dialectical nature of the dialogue game. Thus the model reconciles logical aspects of
burden of proof induced by the defeasible nature of arguments with dialogical aspects of
burden of proof as something that can be allocated by explicit decisions on legal grounds.
In future research it would be interesting to verify whether formal correspondence re-
sults can be proven similar to those for the two-player setup of Prakken (2005) (see Sec-
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tion 3.3 above). Also, the present dialogue game can be extended in various ways. For in-
stance, disputes on move legality could be modelled and the dialogue game could be com-
bined with recent attempts to formalise disputes about the burdens of production (Prakken
et al.; 2005) and persuasion (Prakken and Sartor; 2007). In the present paper such procedural
disputes have not been modelled, in order to focus on how the essential features of adjudi-
cation can be formalised. However, extending the current model to allow for such disputes
seems straightforward.
To expand on this, note first that it would not be a good idea to allow the adversaries
to attack the adjudicator’s decisions on move legality and the burden of production, since
this would not capture that these decisions really are procedural decisions and settle the
issue. (This does not prevent that the legal-procedural rules allow for appeal, but an appelate
procedure starts an entirely new dialogue instead of continuing the current one.) What makes
more sense is to allow the adversaries to discuss procedural issues before the adjudicator
decides on them. In the above model the adjudicator simply declares that a certain move
is illegal or that one of the adversaries has the burden of production for a certain claim. In
an extended model the adjudicator could instead formulate such a decision as a resolution
of a dispute between the parties on these issues. One way to model this, along the lines of
Prakken et al. (2005), is that the speech acts illegal m and burden(ϕ, p) are replaced by
the possibility to move arguments illegal m since P and bopr(ϕ, p) since P (where bopr
stands for ‘burden of production’). Then all the above protocol rules for arguments apply
tot these argue moves, so that the adversaries can discuss these procedural issues just like
any other issue, and the adjudicator can decide these issues just like any other issue. For
disputes about the burden of persuasion the same idea can be realised simply by replacing
the logic of Prakken (2001a) with the one of Prakken and Sartor (2007), since the latter
already allows for arguments of the form burden(ϕ, p) since P (where burden stands for
‘burden of persuasion’). Some further modifications to the protocol may be necessary, again
along the lines of Prakken et al. (2005), to ensure that such metalevel disputes are resolved
before the object level disputes are resumed: this might induce separate argumentation and
decision phases at each level of dispute.
Finally, the reader may wonder what is the point of developing formal models of adju-
dication procedures. As said above in Section 3.1, the main aim of dialogue systems is to
define and study conventions for coherent discourse, where in adjudication dialogues co-
herence can be defined as contributing to fair and effective dispute resolution. The point
of this is partly analytical: by formalising and studying artificial procedures, insight can be
obtained in their properties, in their relation with logic, in how differences in procedures can
be understood as variations on certain elements, and so on. But this also has a normative
point. Desirable properties can be formulated, i.e., properties which make procedures fair
and/or effective, and procedures can be tested on whether they have these properties. Also,
the rules of a specific procedure can be used to assess the quality of an adjudicator’s decision
from this point of view.
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